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QUANTITATIVE  CONTROLS  ON  SUPPLIERS  AND  USERS of credit  have for 
some  time  been  a notable  feature  of policies  designed  to moderate  aggregate 
demand  and,  at times,  to influence  its distribution  in a number  of developed 
countries.  In the United  States,  a fairly  comprehensive  system  of voluntary 
credit  controls  was  in effect  for a time  during  the  Korean  war,  and  quantita- 
tive controls  were  again  advocated  by some to alleviate  the tight financial 
markets  of the  late 1960s.  Indeed,  a law  passed  by Congress  in 1969  included 
a provision,  opposed  by both the administration  and the Federal  Reserve, 
permitting  the President  to authorize  the Federal  Reserve  Board  "to regu- 
late and control  any or all extensions  of credit"  whenever  he determines 
that such  action  is "necessary  or appropriate  for the purpose  of preventing 
or controlling inflation. .  .." 
While  public  discussion  of credit  controls  seems  to have  waned  with the 
restoration  of easier  conditions  in financial  markets,  an examination  of 
their  economic  consequences  appears  worthwhile  for at least  three  reasons. 
First, in the nature  of things, a bout of financial  stringency  is certain  to 
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recur  some day and the advocacy  of credit  controls  as an anti-inflationary 
device  is likely  to recur  with it. Second,  credit  controls  as applied  to banks 
share  some features  with other  devices  recently  employed  in this country, 
such  as Regulation  Q, which  places  ceilings  on the interest  rates  banks  may 
pay on time and savings  deposits.  Third,  some proponents  of credit  con- 
trols favor  them mainly  as a means  of influencing  the composition  of ag- 
gregate  demand  rather  than as a technique  for restraining  its total. As a 
result, such controls  may remain  a relevant  subject  for analysis  even in 
times of relatively  easy credit. 
A major  reason  for the use of quantitative  controls  over  bank credit  in 
some  foreign  economies  has apparently  been  the feeling  that more  "ortho- 
dox" monetary tools such as reserve requirements  and open market 
operations  are, for various  technical  reasons,  inadequate  significantly  to 
restrain  aggregate  demand.  Whatever  the validity of such arguments  as 
applied  to these  countries,  they are  manifestly  irrelevant  to the U.S. situa- 
tion. The Federal  Reserve  plainly  has the means  to restrain  the growth  of 
the major monetary  aggregates  and, after the experience  of  1966 and 
1969-70,  the ability  of monetary  policy to restrain  aggregate  demand  has 
ceased  to be a live issue. 
While  the potency  of monetary  policy  is no longer  seriously  questioned, 
there  undoubtedly  remains  some dissatisfaction  with the manner  in which 
general  monetary  restraint  operates,  and credit controls are sometimes 
mentioned  as possible  remedies.  For one thing, general  policies  of mone- 
tary restraint  require  time to produce  their effects  on aggregate  demand. 
Estimates  of the lags vary,  and  the explanations  offered  for their  existence 
depend  on the relative  significance  attributed  to various  avenues  of mone- 
tary influence.  Those who emphasize  the effects of credit availability, 
especially  bank  credit  availability,  often  point out that  banks  react  initially 
to a tight  money  policy  by selling  securities  and,  perhaps,  by selling  interest- 
bearing  time  certificates  of deposit  (CDs); as was evident  in 1966  and  again 
in 1969,  these actions  enabled  banks  to postpone  the adoption  of tighter 
lending  policies. On this view, quantitative  credit  controls  (or the early 
imposition  of interest  rate  ceilings  under  Regulation  Q) would  speed  credit 
rationing  and increases  in interest  rates on bank lending  and in this way 
would speed  the response  of aggregate  demand. 
A second  objection  to general  monetary  restraint  is the upward  pressure 
that it exerts,  at least  in the short  to medium  run,  on interest  rates.  Due to 
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can have  sharp  and  perhaps  undesirable  effects  on the relative  positions  of 
financial  institutions,  on the allocation  of credit,  and on the income  and 
balance  sheet positions of vulnerable  institutions.  If, by rationing  some 
credit  claimants  out of the market  by fiat, the same  restraint  on aggregate 
demand  could be achieved  with smaller  rises in interest  rates, these un- 
desirable  side effects  of general  monetary  tightening  might,  it is argued,  be 
lessened. 
A closely  related  objection  often raised  to policies  of general  monetary 
restraint  is that they bear  unequally,  perhaps  in socially  undesirable  ways, 
on different  sectors  of the economy.  In particular,  housing  reacts  quickly 
and  sharply  to credit  restraint.  Similarly,  state  and  local  government  finance 
may be especially  sensitive  to general  monetary  restraint  because  of the 
heavy  dependence  of the market  for tax-exempt  bonds on banks,  coupled 
with the tendency  of banks  to favor  business  borrowers  in periods  of re- 
straint.  Another  frequently  mentioned  complaint  is that general  monetary 
restraint  discriminates  against  small  business  borrowers  who are  much  less 
likely  than  larger  firms  to have  significant  alternative  sources  of funds  when 
the availability  of bank  loans  finally  begins  to be curtailed.  In short,  among 
the major  spending  units,  large  corporations  are  least  vulnerable  to mone- 
tary  restraint.  Hence  interest  rates  may have  to be driven  up substantially, 
putting  equally  or perhaps  more deserving  economic  sectors  under  severe 
strain  before corporate  borrowers  are significantly  inhibited.  It is some- 
times suggested  that these various  allocational  properties  of general  tight 
money might be altered  by a proper assortment  of quantitative  credit 
controls. 
This paper attempts  to analyze  the impact of certain  types of credit 
controls  on the level and distribution  of aggregate  demand,  on flows of 
funds, and on interest  rates under  the assumption  of a given "monetary 
policy."  As a matter  of analytical  clarity,  the impact  of quantitative  credit 
controls  can  be compared  with  the noncontrol  situation  only  if some  target 
of general  monetary  instruments  is assumed  to be "the same"  both with 
and  without  the controls.  There  are  any  number  of "unchanged"  monetary 
targets  that could be chosen.  Thus it could be assumed  that the level (or 
rate  of growth)  of reserves,  the narrow  or broad  money  supply,  or the level 
of one or more interest  rates is kept the same in the controls as in the 
no-controls situation. For present purposes, it  is most convenient  to 
assume  that the time  path of the narrowly  defined  money  supply  (currency 
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same  with controls  and in their  absence.  This approach  makes  it possible 
to concentrate  on the pure "credit"  effects of both direct and indirect 
controls  on bank  credit,  and  as a side  benefit,  to illuminate  the relationship 
between  bank credit and the money supply as partially  alternative  and 
competing  "indicators"  of the tightness  or ease of monetary  policy. A 
major  limitation  of the paper  is that it does not provide  quantitative  esti- 
mates of the effects  of controls,  although  some qualitative  judgments  of 
the magnitudes  involved  are  offered.  In the absence  of suitable  econometric 
models  and of relevant  experience  with such  controls  in this country,  pro- 
vision  of such  quantitative  estimates  would  have  been an infeasibly  large- 
conceivably  even an impossible-undertaking. 
Many  critical  considerations  beyond  the purely  economic  consequences 
of controls  traced  out in this paper  would  have  to be examined  before  one 
could  recommend  for or against  any  particular  control  device.  All adminis- 
trative controls, including  those on credit, interfere  with the market's 
allocation  of goods and services,  profits  and incomes.  While  some of these 
interferences  may be the deliberate  aim of controls,  they may well prove 
to have other effects that are not desired. Similarly,  all administrative 
controls  involve some bureaucratic  machinery.  In the present  case there 
would undoubtedly  be problems  in making adjustments  to the special 
circumstances  of certain  borrowers  or classes  of borrowers.  Base periods 
would  have  to be established  from  which  permitted  credit  expansions  could 
be calculated.  In certain  situations,  "announcement  effects"  might  be ex- 
pected, as borrowers  rushed  to get accommodated  under  the newly  pro- 
mulgated  ceilings.  An additional  problem  is that all controls  tend to gen- 
erate  evasion,  both in the narrow  sense  that  the rules  may  be evaded  and  in 
the larger  sense  that, given  time, the market  tends  to generate  alternatives 
to the channels  dammed  up by controls.  These factors  tend to lead to a 
proliferation  of controls and so on. Major questions  arise: Would the 
potential  desirable  effects  of controls  offset  these  various  liabilities?  Would 
alternatives  such as tax and subsidy  schemes,  federal  loan guarantees,  or 
direct  federal  lending  achieve  the desirable  effects  more satisfactorily?  As 
the recent  agony over incomes  policy suggests,  questions  of this general 
sort cannot be answered  in the abstract;  they must be examined  in the 
context  of a specific  political  environment. 
It should  also  be noted  that  the analysis  of this  paper  rests  on the propo- 
sition  that  changes  in the relative  supplies  of various  financial  instruments, 
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devices,  affect  the composition  of output  only because  financial  specializa- 
tion makes  certain  categories  of spending  especially  sensitive  to develop- 
ments  in the markets  for specific  financial  instruments.  For example,  it is 
reasonable  to assume  that any device  that causes  financial  intermediaries 
to shift  out of corporate  bonds  and  into  mortgages  will  tend  to shift  relative 
rates  on these  instruments  and  thereby  induce  a shift  out of plant  and  equip- 
ment  investment  and  into housing.  If spending  units  could  finance  outlays 
of any  type  as easily  through  mortgage  issues  as through  bond  flotations,  or 
if the various  kinds  of financial  and  physical  assets  were  near-perfect  sub- 
stitutes  in the  portfolios  of nonfinancial  units,  such  shifts  in the  composition 
of output  might  not take  place.  But  it is a pervasive  fact  of financial  life that 
various  modes  of finance  tend to be specialized  to particular  types  of out- 
lays. Real investment  by business  and households  in the types of physical 
capital  most characteristic  of each sector  is far more sensitive  to interest 
rates on the financial  instruments  "specialized"  to these activities  than it 
is to yields  on financial  assets  linked  to other  categories  of spending.2 
This  paper  will consider  the following  kinds  of credit  controls:  (1) quan- 
titative  limits on total bank credit,  but not on the composition  of bank 
credit  (the impact  of Regulation  Q and like devices  is also reexamined  in 
this section);  (2) quantitative  limits  on specific  components  of bank  credit 
such as loans to business,  finance  companies,  and consumers,  but not on 
the total; and (3) quantitative  limits on effective  demand  for credit-spe- 
cifically,  controls  over  corporate  capital  issues. 
Effects  of Devices  Limiting  Total  Bank  Credit 
Quantitative  ceilings on total bank credit are probably  of particular 
interest  in financial  systems  where  orthodox  central  bank instruments  are 
not adequate  tools for controlling  such  credit.  The Federal  Reserve,  how- 
ever,  can fix total bank credit  or any other single  banking  and monetary 
aggregate  at any desired  magnitude,  at least to a crude approximation, 
through  its control over nonborrowed  reserves.  To do this, it must of 
course  take  rough  account  of relevant  developments  in the banking  system 
that are  not under  its direct  control  (such  as the time-demand  deposit  mix, 
the public's  currency-deposit  ratio, and so forth). 
2. I have profited  from a rigorous  treatment  by D. C. Rao and Ira Kaminow of the 
elasticity  conditions  tiecessary  for shifts in intermediary  demand  schedules  for particular 
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While the Federal  Reserve  can theoretically  set nonborrowed  reserves 
at whatever  level  is needed  to induce  the banking  system  to provide  roughly 
the target  amount  of total bank  credit,  a direct  quantitative  control  might 
nevertheless  be considered  desirable  for three reasons. First, to hit the 
bank credit target with the desired  degree of accuracy  requires  correct 
allowance  for the offsetting  items;  this may  be difficult  to achieve.  Second, 
the Federal  Reserve  might  wish  to hit the target  level of bank  credit  more 
quickly  than is considered  feasible  with conventional  tools. Third,  if the 
Federal  Reserve  wishes  to control independently  the magnitudes  of two 
different  monetary  variables,  such as bank credit  and the money supply, 
it must have an instrument  beyond  those of general  reserve  control. To 
be sure,  the additional  instrument  need not be something  as blunt as the 
power to set a quantitative  bank credit  quota. It could instead  be some 
device  such  as Regulation  Q that operates  on nondemand  deposit  liabilities 
and therefore  drives  a wedge  between  money supply  behavior  and bank 
credit  behavior.  Indeed,  as there  will be occasion  to emphasize  at several 
points, Regulation  Q and similar  controls share a number  of analytical 
features  with direct  controls  on total bank credit. 
BANKING  SYSTEM EFFECTS 
The effects  of a bank  credit  control,  for a given  money  supply  target,  on 
bank reserves,  deposits,  and credit  must  be clarified  as a first step toward 
the analysis  of its effects  on the economy.  If, for simplicity,  a constant  cur- 
rency-demand  deposit ratio is assumed,  the assumption  that the money 
supply  target  is the same  whether  or not bank credit  controls  are imposed 
also implies  that  the target  level of demand  deposits  must  be the same  with 
and  without  controls.  The  situation  of the  banking  system  with  and  without 
controls, assuming  the given demand  deposit target is achieved  in both 
instances,  can be illustrated  with the following  hypothetical  consolidated 
balance  sheet: 
Without  controls 
Reserves  30  Demand  deposits  100 
Bank  credit  220  Other  liabilities  150 
(Time  deposits  100) 
(Nondeposit 
liabilities  50) 
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With controls 
Reserves  30  Demand deposits  100 
Bank  credit  200  Other  liabilities  130 
(Time  deposits?) 
(Nondeposit  liabilities?) 
230  230 
As this balance  sheet  makes  clear,  if the Federal  Reserve  does successfully 
hold  the level  of demand  deposits  to its unchanged  target  and  if the imposi- 
tion of controls  does lower total bank credit,  then, simply  as a matter  of 
accounting,  downward  adjustments  must take place in the nondemand 
deposit liabilities  of the banking  system.  As media of short-run  adjust- 
ments,  the most important  of the liabilities  are clearly  time deposits  and 
the nondeposit  short-term  interest-bearing  liabilities.  In the most recent 
tight money  period,  the latter  consisted  mainly  of head office  borrowings 
(through  overseas  branches)  of Eurodollars  and commercial  paper  issued 
by holding  companies  of commercial  banks.3 
How would  banks  in fact  react  to the imposition  of a quantitative  limita- 
tion on bank  credit?  Would  the money  supply  and  demand  deposits  remain 
unchanged  at their targeted  levels without  Federal  Reserve  intervention, 
or would action by the Federal  Reserve  be required?  Would it be tech- 
nically  feasible  for  the Federal  Reserve  to engineer  an  increase  in the money 
supply along a given target growth path while restricting  bank credit 
through  quantitative  controls? 
Banks faced with the necessity  of reducing  loans and investments  to 
meet a bank credit  quota could, in theory, use the proceeds  of security 
sales and loan repayments  to build up excess  reserves.  As long as banks 
have interest-bearing  liabilities  outstanding,  however,  they seem far more 
likely  to use these  proceeds  to repay  expensive  Eurodollar  borrowings  and 
to allow a runoff  in CD and other time and savings  deposit liabilities. 
The latter  would  be accomplished  in part  by simply  refusing  to renew  some 
types of maturing  deposits,  but presumably  it would be brought  about 
mainly  through  the effect  of reduced  interest  yields  on the public's  desire 
to hold  these  deposits.  In any  case, a runoff  of time  deposits  would liberate 
3. Whether  declines  in this bank-related  commercial  paper  could serve  as a counter- 
part on the liability side to bank credit reductions  would depend upon whether the 
credit restrictions  were applied  narrowly  to commercial  banks or, more broadly,  to the 
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excess  reserves  at individual  banks  and in the banking  system  as a whole. 
To the extent  that these  excess  reserves  could  be redistributed  through  the 
federal  funds market  to banks still under  their credit  limits, they would 
provide  the potential  for demand  deposit  expansion.  To this extent,  there- 
fore, the conventional  instruments  would  be needed  to mop up the excess 
reserves  in conformity  with the unchanged  money  supply  target. 
The following balance sheets (1) and (2) illustrate,  respectively,  the 
position of commercial  banks  before  and after  both the imposition  of the 
credit ceiling and the related action of the Federal  Reserve  to mop up 
excess  reserves.  In the example,  the new  credit  ceiling  is assumed  to be 155; 
reserve  requirements  against  demand  and  time deposits  are assumed  to be 
20 percent  and 5 percent,  respectively;  and the bank demand  for excess 
reserves  is assumed  to be zero both "before"  and "after."  In this illustra- 
tion, bank reserves  decline  by 1.1, reflecting  an open market  sale by the 
Federal  Reserve  of the same amount. 
(1) 
Required  reserves  25  Demand deposits  100 
Excess  reserves  0  Time deposits  100 
Bank credit  175 
200  200 
(2) 
Required  reserves  23.9  Demand deposits  100.0 
Excess  reserves  0.0  Time deposits  78.9 
Bank credit  155.0 
178.9  178.9 
The task of expanding  the money supply  along a targeted  growth  path 
at a time  when  bank  credit  expansion  was  being  constrained  by an officially 
imposed  ceiling  would create  some rather  novel problems  for the central 
bank.  In particular,  the existence  of the bank  credit  ceiling  would  inhibit- 
although  not preclude-the use of the orthodox  instruments  to promote 
monetary  expansion.  The Federal Reserve  could still engage in expan- 
sionary  open market  purchases.  However,  the excess reserves  created  in 
the process  could  not be used  for further  deposit  expansion,  since  any  such 
expansion  could  be set  in motion  only  by increased  bank  lending  and  invest- 
ing in violation  of the credit  ceiling.  This means,  in effect,  that the Fed- 
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dollar  of reserve  expansion.4  No "multiple  expansion"  of deposits  would 
be possible.  Whenever  the  bank  credit  quota  was  raised  or lifted  altogether, 
moreover,  increases  in reserve  requirements  or massive  open market  sales 
would probably  be needed  to prevent  an avalanche  of new deposits  and 
credit  arising  from  previously  sterilized  excess  reserves  or from any other 
distortions  the ceiling  might  have  produced. 
EFFECTS ON  AGGREGATE  DEMAND 
The effects of bank credit ceilings on aggregate  demand, given the 
money  supply,  cannot  be determined  on an a priori  basis alone.  The out- 
come depends  on which assets the banks reduce,  on which nondemand 
deposit liabilities are allowed to decline, on the instruments  in which 
former  holders  of these  liabilities  choose  to reinvest  their  funds,  and on the 
relative  elasticities  of the various  sectors  of aggregate  demand  with  respect 
to interest  rates on the various  financial  instruments.  The range  of theo- 
retically possible outcomes can be  illustrated  by  a  few hypothetical 
situations.5 
1. Suppose  the commercial  banks concentrate  the reduction  in credit 
in mortgage  lending,  allowing  savings  deposits  to run off (presumably  by 
lowering  interest  rates).  Assume  further  that holders  of these  deposits  rein- 
vest in savings  and loan shares  and that the savings  associations  increase 
their  mortgage  lending  accordingly.  In this case there  would probably  be 
4. By assumption,  bank credit would not expand at all with the expansion of the 
money supply. However, the open market purchases  of the Federal Reserve required 
to increase  the money supply  would mean an increase  in Federal  Reserve  credit.  In the 
absence of any changes  in time deposits, Federal  Reserve  credit would have to rise by 
the amount of the targeted  increase  in the money supply. 
5. The analysis of the next several paragraphs  leans heavily on the formal model 
developed by James Tobin in "Deposit Interest Ceilings as a  Monetary Control," 
Journal  of Money, Credit  and Banking,  Vol. 2 (February  1970), esp. pp. 11-14. To be 
relevant  to the present  case, the Tobin model must be reformulated  slightly, replacing 
his assumption  that nonborrowed  reserves  are fixed by policy with the assumption  that 
the equilibrium  value of demand  deposits  is made to conform  with a policy target,  with 
the central bank supplying whatever volume of nonborrowed  reserves is needed to 
achieve this objective. This transformation  renders irrelevant  what Tobin calls the 
"reserve  effect" of changes in such liabilities  as time deposits. In addition, the Tobin 
model would  have to be modified  to allow for more  than one type of private  real capital, 
for more than one type of private  financial  instrument,  and for the existence  of credit 
rationing. Readers of the Tobin paper will recognize  that the next several  paragraphs 
of the present  paper  deal  largely  with the question  of the probable  sign, in a multisector, 
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little or no effect  on the level or composition  of aggregate  demand.  The 
credit  ceiling  would act mainly  to shift the competitive  balance  (and the 
flow of mortgage  lending)  against  the commercial  banks and in favor of 
the competing  savings  institutions. 
2. Assume the same as above, except that this time the commercial 
banks  meet their total bank credit  quota by selling off U.S. government 
securities  rather  than  mortgages.  In this case  there  would  be a net increase 
in the demand  for mortgages  and a net decline  in the demand  for U.S. 
government  securities.  Mortgage  rates would tend to fall and rates on 
Treasury  securities  to rise.  Although  one cannot  be absolutely  sure  a priori, 
it is certainly  reasonable  to assume  that aggregate  demand  would  actually 
be stimulated  by the imposition  of bank credit  ceilings  in this case since 
housing  outlays  are  quite  sensitive  to mortgage  rates  and  availability,  while 
federal  spending  is not sensitive  to Treasury  borrowing  costs. 
3. Again consider  the general  situation posited in the previous  two 
cases,  with  banks  this  time  reducing  holdings  of state  and  local government 
securities.  As before,  the demand  for mortgages  would  rise  and,  as a result, 
mortgage  rates  would  tend to fall. At the same  time, however,  the market 
demand  for tax-exempts  would  fall and  rates  on these  securities  would  tend 
to rise.  The net effect  on aggregate  demand  would  depend  largely  upon  the 
relative  elasticities  of spending  on housing  and on state and local govern- 
ment activities  to interest  rates on the respective  instruments  normally 
used to finance  them. 
4. Assume  this time that commercial  banks  cut back  primarily  on lend- 
ing to business  and  consumers.  Suppose  the banks  offset  these  cutbacks  on 
the liability side by allowing  large CDs to run down and that former 
holders  of these instruments  attempt  to reinvest  their funds in Treasury 
bills. In this case  it seems  fairly  clear-though again  not absolutely  certain 
a priori-that aggregate  demand  would  be depressed. 
5. Assume banks cut back on business  lending, and allow large CDs 
to run off, and, further,  that former  investors  in CDs attempt  to reinvest 
their  funds  in business  paper  such as commercial  paper.  For the moment, 
assume  that all business  borrowers  have access  to the commercial  paper 
market  and are indifferent  as to whether  they borrow  in this market  or 
from  banks.  Assume  further  that investors  are  indifferent  between  holding 
interest-bearing  bank liabilities  and commercial  paper at the preexisting 
rate structure.  In this set of circumstances,  there would be no net effect 
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the banking  system  will now be undertaken  directly  in the open market 
with no change  in commercial  paper  rates. 
Given  the welter  of conceivable  outcomes  suggested  by these  five  exam- 
ples, it is clear  that the effect  of a bank  credit  ceiling  on the level of aggre- 
gate demand  can, theoretically  at least, be anything  at all. Nevertheless,  it 
seems  reasonably  clear  that such  ceilings  would  in practice  prove  to be de- 
pressing  on balance.  The most favorable  possibility  for aggregate  demand 
is that nonbank  investors  might  prove  indifferent  between  interest-bearing 
bank  liabilities  and paper  issued  by the nonbank  nonfinancial  sectors  and 
these sectors,  in turn,  might  be indifferent  between  borrowing  from  banks 
and borrowing  directly  through  the market.  Barring  sectoral  distribution 
effects,  the impact  of a bank  credit  ceiling  on aggregate  demand  in this  case 
would  be essentially  a standoff.  Its main  effect  would  be merely  to reduce 
credit  extension  through  the banks  acting  as intermediaries  and  to increase 
credit extended  directly  through  the market or through  nonbank  inter- 
mediaries.  The nonbank  channels  of credit,  being  perfect  substitutes  for  the 
bank channel,  would provide  a frictionless  substitute  and, again  barring 
distribution  effects,  there  would be no effect  on aggregate  demand  or on 
the general  level of interest  rates. 
In fact, however,  nonbank  investors  would not be indifferent  between 
holding interest-bearing  bank liabilities and other market paper, nor 
would nonfinancial  borrowers  be indifferent  between borrowing  from 
banks and from nonbank  channels.  Indeed,  the preferences  of these two 
groups  would  work  in the direction  of depressing  aggregate  demand  should 
a bank  credit  ceiling  be imposed.  On the one hand,  former  holders  of time 
deposits  may not be willing to shift their funds, dollar for dollar, into 
nonbank  paper  at its existing  interest  rate. To some extent,  at least, they 
may prefer  demand  deposit  balances.  Much more to the point, however, 
nonfinancial  units that formerly  borrowed  from banks are most unlikely 
to be willing  or able  to shift  to nonbank  sources  of funds,  dollar  for dollar, 
at the existing  interest  rates.  This  reluctance  is, indeed,  the strongest  single 
reason  for believing  that a bank credit  ceiling  would, on balance,  depress 
aggregate  demand. 
A number  of factors  would  help  make  nonbank  alternative  credit  a less- 
than-perfect  substitute  for bank loans. First, some small business and 
consumer  borrowers  are unlikely  to be able to substitute  fully nonbank 
credit or other financial  sources for the now unavailable  bank credit. 
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preferred"  to other  forms  of finance,  one must  assume  that, at the existing 
set of interest  rates,  the nonbank  alternatives  are  regarded  by borrowers  as 
inferior  in terms  of transactions  costs, portfolio  balance,  or convenience 
considerations.  Thus,  for example,  while  a large  firm  may  be able  to enter 
the commercial  paper  market  to replace  cutbacks  in bank loans, it will 
face set-up costs. Moreover,  the liquidity position of the firm will be 
weaker  since,  as events  in 1970  dramatically  demonstrated,  the firm  cannot 
count absolutely  on rolling over commercial  paper as needed,  especially 
if bank back-up  lines are not available.  Smaller,  lesser-known  firms  may 
not be able  to sell either  long- or short-term  capital  market  instruments  at 
all and  may have  to turn  to commercial  factors  or depend  more  heavily  on 
trade  credit  from suppliers.  But credit  from factors  is less reliable  than a 
line of bank credit and is likely to be more expensive.  Trade credit is 
probably  also more expensive  in monetary  terms and may weaken the 
borrower's  position  vis-a-vis  his supplier  with respect  to all sorts of non- 
price  terms  of trade.  Finally,  the would-be  borrower  may sell short-term 
financial  assets, if he has them, to substitute  for the unavailable  bank 
loans. But this, too, entails  obvious  risks  in the form of reduced  liquidity. 
Thus,  while  all sorts  of potential  substitutes  for bank  borrowing  are avail- 
able, none of them will be a perfect substitute.  Therefore,  there will be 
at least some cuts in total credit flows and in spending  on output by 
businesses  and consumers  whose access to  bank borrowing  has been 
reduced.6 
To be sure,  the distribution  effects  could  turn  out to be expansionary  on 
balance  as examples  (2) and, possibly,  (3) outlined  above illustrate.  They 
would  be most likely  to be expansionary  if the net effect  of the redistribu- 
tion of flows through  the various  credit channels  were to increase  sub- 
stantially  the fraction  of funds  flowing  into housing  finance-since, to all 
appearances,  housing  is the most interest-sensitive  demand  sector.  There 
6. The argument  can be put in supply-demand  terms as follows: Suppose  the credit 
ceiling reduces  bank credit by 100 and that the banks allow an equal volume of time 
deposits  to run off. Even if lenders  are indifferent  between  time deposits  and other open 
market  paper,  the supply  curve of funds extended  through  such paper will shift out by 
no more than 100. If borrowers  do not regard  open market  borrowing  as a perfect  sub- 
stitute for bank borrowing,  or if some borrowers  simply do not have access to open 
market borrowing,  the demand schedule for funds borrowed  in the open market will 
shift out by something  less than 100. The result will be a fall in the open market  rate. 
Credit  extended  in this market  will rise, but by less than 100. Consequently,  total credit 
extended  to nonhnancial  borrowers  (bank credit  plus open market  credit)  will fall. It is 
easy to show further  that spending by these sectors will also fall, given conventional 
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seems  to be no particular  reason  to expect  such an increase  in the share  of 
mortgage  funds, however-or  at least no reason unless the cutback in 
bank interest-bearing  liabilities  bears relatively  most heavily on savings 
deposits and on other consumer-type  deposits that are close substitutes 
for the liabilities  of the specialized  mortgage  lending  institutions.  Such  an 
eventuality  does not seem likely. On the contrary,  especially  in a tight 
money  period,  the commercial  banks  would  appear  more  likely  to cut back 
relatively  most heavily  on high-cost  liabilities  in the money  market,  such  as 
large CDs and Eurodollar  borrowings.  Moreover,  even if the cutbacks 
were mainly in savings deposits, with a resulting  shift of funds to the 
nonbank  savings  institutions  and a stimulus  to housing,  there is still no 
guarantee  that the distribution  effect  on aggregate  demand  would  be posi- 
tive on balance.  One would also have to know what earning  assets  were 
reduced  by the banks  in response  to the credit  ceiling. 
To summarize,  some bank borrowers  do not have access  to important 
nonbank sources of credit. Moreover,  borrowers  in general  will, for a 
variety  of reasons,  be unwilling  to shift their borrowings,  dollar for dol- 
lar, to nonbank  sources  at their existing  interest  rates. Thus the conse- 
quence  of restrictions  on total bank credit  will be some reduction  in both 
total credit flows and aggregate  demand.  In theory, a redistribution  of 
credit  that favored  sectors  that are  highly  sensitive  to credit  market  condi- 
tions could offset  the general  tendency  for aggregate  demand  to decline. 
Despite this possibility,  the net overall  effect  is in fact virtually  certain  to 
be downward.7 
REGULATION  Q  AND  AGGREGATE  DEMAND 
The above analysis of the impact of controls on total bank credit 
essentially  applies  also to Regulation  Q and similar  devices  that tend to 
restrict  the volume of nondemand  deposit bank liabilities.  In the bank 
credit  control  case, ceilings  are put on bank credit  and  the banks  are  thus 
7. It is somewhat  tempting  to argue  the case in familiar  IS-LM terms. On this inter- 
pretation,  the imposition  of bank credit  ceilings  in the face of less-than-perfect  nonbank 
alternatives  shifts the IS curve  to the left at any given  level of "the"  interest  rate. Given 
the money supply, by assumption  fixed at the policy target, and assuming  no shift in 
the liquidity preference  schedule  at given levels of "the" interest  rate, the equilibrium 
values of both aggregate  demand and the interest rate would fall. However, since a 
multiplicity of financial markets, demand sectors, and interest rates is an essential 
feature of this problem,  the IS-LM framework  with its single interest  rate is a clumsy 
device. Thus, while the "average"  (in some sense) level of interest rates might fall in 
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induced  to lower  offering  rates  on time deposits  and other  interest-bearing 
liabilities.  In the Regulation  Q case,  these  offering  rates  are  reduced  by fiat 
and the banks  are induced  to cut back supplies  of loans and investments. 
Perhaps  the most significant  difference  between  the two approaches,  in 
terms of their effects  on aggregate  demand,  is that Regulation  Q can be 
"fine-tuned"  to bear  on particular  classes  of bank  interest-bearing  liabilities 
as desired,  while  in the bank  credit  control  case  the banks  themselves  deter- 
mine what interest-bearing  liabilities  will be reduced  and in what propor- 
tion. The precise  nature  of the reduction  in liabilities  is significant  because 
it influences  the likely reinvestment  demand  by former  holders  of these 
liabilities,  thereby  influencing,  in turn,  the direction  and magnitude  of the 
"distribution  effect"  noted earlier. 
If, for example,  the Regulation  Q ceiling  is restricted  to savings  deposits 
and  consumer-type  time deposits  at commercial  banks  alone,  reinvestment 
will probably  be heavily  weighted  toward mutual  savings  bank deposits 
and savings  and  loan shares.  This  is the case most likely  to have a positive 
distribution  effect by tending  to increase  the proportion  of credit  flows 
moving into mortgages.  By the same token, it is the case least likely to 
have a significant  depressing  effect on aggregate  demand.  Indeed, the 
overall  effect  on demand  could conceivably  be neutral  or even  positive  on 
balance. 
In recent  years,  of course,  ceilings  on interest  rates on savings  deposits 
have been applied  not only to commercial  banks, but to mutual savings 
banks  and savings  and  loan associations  as well.  This approach,  especially 
in view  of the adjustment  of ceiling  rates  to reflect  the previous  patterns  of 
institutional  differentials,  has greatly  reduced  any effect  the ceilings  might 
otherwise have had on  the competitive  balance between commercial 
banks and the two other  types of institutions.  In this situation,  it is not 
entirely  clear  what effect  the ceilings  on savings  deposit  interest  rates  may 
have had on the proportion  of funds  moving  into housing.  James  Tobin 
and Milton Friedman,  who have analyzed  this problem,  seem to agree 
that across-the-board  rate ceilings on savings-type  deposits may well 
curtail,  on balance,  the supply  of funds  to housing  by reducing  the flow of 
funds to  all the institutions  offering  such deposits, taken as a group, 
including the intermediaries  specializing  in  mortgage lending.8 Their 
8. James Tobin, "Deposit Interest Ceilings as a Monetary Control," and Milton 
Friedman,  "Controls  on Interest  Rates Paid by Banks,"  Journal  of Money, Credit  and 
Banking,  Vol. 2 (February  1970),  pp. 8-11 and 28-29, respectively. Richard  G. Davis  79 
argument  assumes,  however,  that the ceilings  are not needed  to prevent  a 
wholesale  collapse  of the specialized  lending  institutions  from an earnings 
squeeze  that might,  in the absence  of deposit  rate ceilings,  be precipitated 
by sharp  rises  in open  market  rates.9 
The application  of Regulation  Q ceilings  to large CDs (and of reserve 
requirements  to bank-related  commercial  paper and to Eurodollar  bor- 
rowings)  have  had, so far as can be discerned,  no "distribution  effects"  on 
credit  flows that have been stimulative  to aggregate  demand.  Moreover, 
the unavailability  or relative  unattractiveness  (at existing  rates) of non- 
bank sources  of funds  exerts  its full demand-depressing  force  in this case. 
On balance,  it seems  reasonable  to conclude  that Regulation  Q ceilings, 
at least as they have  been administered  in recent  tight  money  periods,  have 
tended  to reduce  the level of aggregate  demand  relative  to what it other- 
wise would have been, given the money supply.  The size of this effect 
would,  of course,  be useful  knowledge,  but  there  seems  to be no reasonable 
way to estimate  it.10 
REGULATION  Q  AND  THE  MONETARY  INDICATOR  PROBLEM 
This analysis  of the effects of Regulation  Q on credit and aggregate 
demand  has some  bearing  on issues  raised  in recent  years  about  the com- 
9. Tobin argues  that the drain on savings and loan earnings  that would, in the ab- 
sence of rate ceilings,  have resulted  during  the 1966-69 period  could have been met sim- 
ply by reductions  in the earned  surplus  these  institutions  as a group  had built up in earlier 
years. However, this view is based on a study of aggregate  industry  data and gives no 
weight to tlle shaky liquidity and earnings position of individual  institutions and the 
potential  for general  runs  that might  have been created  by a few well-publicized  failures. 
10. It may be of some interest  to note the pattern  of errors  in "reduced  form" equa- 
tions relating  current  changes  in the gross  national  product  to current  and past  changes  in 
the narrow  money stock during  the most recent  tight money period  (roughly  early 1969 
through  early 1970),  a period during  which Regulation  Q acted as a binding constraint 
on time deposit  rates.  During  the four-quarter  period  beginning  with the third  quarter  of 
1969  (a reasonable  starting  point given the lag structures  of the equations),  these money 
supply  equations  (estimated  on data from 1952:2 to 1968:2) show a clear-cut  tendency 
to overpredict  quarterly  increases  in GNP-though,  to be sure, no individual  error  was 
as large as twice the standard  error of estimate. A tendency  for narrow  money supply 
equations  to overpredict  GNP during  periods  when Q is binding  is consistent  with the 
argument  presented  in the text. Analogous reduced  form equations using bank credit 
instead of the narrow  money supply  tend, by contrast,  to underpredict  GNP during  the 
period most directly  influenced  by tight money-though again,  all individual  errors  were 
less than twice the standard  error of estimate for the equation. A tendency  for bank 
credit equations to underpredict  GNP during periods when Q is binding is similarly 
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parative  usefulness  of "bank  credit"  and  the money  supply  as "indicators" 
of the impact  of monetary  policy  whenever  the  relationship  between  the  two 
aggregates  is influenced  by the intervention  of Regulation  Q. 
Two opposing  positions  have developed  on these issues.  At one pole is 
the view  that,  while  Regulation  Q may  have  sharp  effects  on relative  money 
market  rates  and on the channeling  of credit  flows, it has little or no sig- 
nificance  for the impact  of monetary  policy  on aggregate  demand.  Accord- 
ing to this view, the money supply  is the only appropriate  aggregate  for 
measuring  the impact  of monetary  policy. Fluctuations  in the growth  of 
bank  credit  within  the context  of a given  expansion  of money  supply  should 
be discounted  as essentially  irrelevant  and misleading,  reflecting  "mere" 
disintermediation  or reintermediation. 
The opposing  view is that Regulation  Q has been an essential  part of 
restrictive  monetary  policy in recent  years  and that on several  occasions, 
perhaps  most notably  in 1966, banks really  began to tighten  their lend- 
ing policies only when they began to fear that application  of Q ceilings 
might  shut  off CDs as a source  of lendable  funds.11  Proponents  of Regula- 
tion Q as a policy  tool have also argued  on occasion  that, through  its use, 
a given degree of economic  restraint  can be achieved  at lower interest 
rates  than would  be possible  if that restraint  were obtained  through  rela- 
tively slower  growth  of the money supply  unaccompanied  by an effective 
Q ceiling.  In part,  this latter  argument  seems  to have  been based on little 
more than the superficial  (and really  irrelevant)  observation  that a lifting 
of the Q ceiling  has on at least one or two conspicuous  occasions  been 
accompanied  by  a run-up in market rates on  similar money market 
instruments.  Some proponents  of this view, however, seem to have in 
mind ideas similar  to those presented  above: If Q ceilings  are imposed, 
some borrowers  will drop out of the credit  market  either  because  alterna- 
tive open market  channels are not available  to them or because these 
channels  are  regarded  as inferior.  With  these  borrowers  wholly or partially 
out of the credit  market,  "average"  interest  rates  will fall at a given  money 
supply  (or, for that matter,  at any given  level of aggregate  demand).12 
11. A flavor  of some of the elements  underlying  this view can be found in "Monetary 
Policy, Savings Competition and Commercial  Bank Lending Behavior," remarks  by 
Governor  Andrew  Brimmer  at a luncheon held in Boston, July 18, 1966. 
12. The notion of "average"  rate behavior  does raise an index number  problem  since 
it is clear that, even under the conditions assumed,  rates in some markets  could rise. 
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While  some  opponents  of Regulation  Q would  rely  on the narrow  money 
supply  alone as their  indicator,  the Regulation  Q adherents  seem  never  to 
have  embraced  the opposite  extreme  position  that bank credit  alone is the 
correct  measure  of the tightness  or ease of monetary  policy. In any case, 
the only position  compatible  with  the analysis  presented  here  clearly  must 
be somewhere  in the middle.  To argue  that the effects  of Regulation  Q are 
irrelevant  and that only the behavior  of the money supply  need be con- 
sulted  to gauge  the impact  of policy  is to assume  that the financial  system 
is perfectly  elastic,  that  is, all  borrowers  can  find  alternative  nonbank  credit 
channels  that will be equally acceptable  in terms of cost, convenience, 
liquidity,  and so on. Only in such a case would the level of aggregate 
demand  be totally unaffected  by the imposition  (or relaxation)  of bank 
credit  controls  via Regulation  Q. 
On the other  hand,  it is equally  unacceptable  to believe  that  the financial 
system  has no elasticity-a view  to which  the proponents  of Regulation  Q 
have  at times  come  perilously  close. On the whole,  the unwillingness  of the 
Federal  Open  Market  Committee  to embrace  exclusively  either  the money 
supply  or bank credit,  as evidenced  in its 1970 published  reports,  seems 
justified. 
SUMMARY 
Direct quantative  controls  over total bank credit  seem to have little to 
recommend  them in the U.S. setting,  even from a relatively  narrow  tech- 
nical point of view. As noted at the outset, such quantitative  restrictions 
are not needed  to achieve  any given  degree  of general  monetary  restraint, 
since more conventional  policy instruments,  such as open market  opera- 
tions, appear  sufficient  for that purpose.  To be sure, such controls  could 
be used to reduce  the volume of bank credit associated  with any given 
money supply.  Such a restriction  can be expected  to have various  effects 
on credit  flows, on interest  rates, and on the level and composition  of 
aggregate  demand.  However,  substantially  the same  effects  can  be achieved 
with existing  devices,  such as Regulation  Q, that influence  the volume  of 
bank credit  relative  to any given money supply  by discouraging  or pro- 
hibiting  the issue of nondemand  deposit,  interest-earning  bank liabilities. 
of the reinvestment  demand of former CD holders failed to match the distribution  of 
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Perhaps,  as noted earlier,  given  results  could be achieved  more quickly 
and  with  more  precision  through  controls  over  total  bank  credit  in the form 
of quantitative  quotas than through  more conventional  tools. It seems 
likely,  however,  that these "advantages"  would  prove  of dubious  value  in 
practice.  Thus, the speed  with which  any given degree  of monetary  strin- 
gency  can  be achieved  is likely  to be constrained  more  by the need  to avoid 
abrupt  and wrenching  changes  in financial  market  conditions  than  by any 
deficiency  of existing  monetary  tools. The need to implement  a policy of 
restraint  in a reasonably  gradual  way  would  be as much  a factor  in the im- 
plementation  of quantitative  controls  as it is with  respect  to existing  means 
of producing  monetary  restraint.  After  all, existing  devices  such  as reserve 
requirements  and Regulation  Q could, in principle,  be used to produce 
sudden  and  drastic  reductions  in the money  supply  or bank  credit,  or both, 
in the unlikely  event such  changes  were  desired. 
Perhaps  quantitative  controls  over  total bank  credit  would  indeed  speed 
the effect of a restrictive  monetary  policy in reducing  the availability  of 
bank loans to business.  A similar  quickening  in the rate at which  banks 
begin to tighten  business  lending  policies  in a period  of tight money  can, 
however,  be achieved  through  the  judicious  use of Regulation  Q, or  through 
the use of specific  controls  over  bank  lending  to business  discussed  in the 
next section. 
The argument  that quantitative  controls  would operate  with more pre- 
cision than existing  techniques  also does not seem very weighty.  As long 
as the precise  impact  of any given degree  of monetary  restraint  (however 
measured)  on the economy  is as uncertain  as it is at present,  the importance 
of pinpoint  precision  in controlling  bank  credit  is very  much  open  to ques- 
tion. Existing  techniques  are adequate  to achieve  broadly  defined  goals. 
Probably  this is sufficient. 
On balance,  the main legitimate  interest  in quantitative  credit  controls 
seems  to lie in their  possible  allocative  effects.  These  are  considered  in more 
detail  in the next  two sections,  which  deal  with  controls  over  specific  types 
of credit. 
Effects  of Quantitative  Controls  on Specific  Components  of Bank Credit 
"Controls"  over  the composition  of bank earning  assets  have probably 
been  advocated  more  frequently  than  controls  over  the total. Recently,  for 
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bank assets indirectly  through  differential  reserve  requirement  ratios on 
various  categories  of earning  assets.  Presumably  the aim of controls  over 
particular  components  of total bank  credit  would  be to influence  its distri- 
bution  so as ultimately  to reallocate  resources.  It is possible,  for example, 
to imagine  controls  over business  lending  by banks as a way of quickly 
influencing  a sector  often  thought  to be the last to feel the effects  of a gen- 
eral  monetary  tightening.  Thus a given  slowdown  in the monetary  growth 
rate  coupled  with  controls  over  business  loans  might  achieve  a given  degree 
of restraint  over aggregate  demand  in a more balanced  way, with less of 
the burden  falling  on housing,  for example,  than would be true given  the 
same overall  monetary  slowdown  but without  specific  controls  over  busi- 
ness loans. 
For purposes  of the analysis  that  follows,  it is assumed  that  separate  and 
individual  quantitative  restrictions  are imposed on commercial  and in- 
dustrial  loans, on loans  to sales  finance  companies,  and  on consumer  loans 
-again  without  altering  the money  supply  target.  These  categories,  which 
relate most directly  to business  and consumer  spending,  seem to be the 
most likely objects  of controls.  Mortgage  finance  and state and local gov- 
ernment  credit,  as the most  plausible  intended  beneficiaries  of credit  reallo- 
cation, are hardly  likely  themselves  to be candidates  for controls.  Nor do 
bank purchases  of federal  government  securities  seem a likely target  for 
controls.  No specific  assumption  is made about total bank credit. Quite 
conceivably,  total bank credit might decline as a result of controls on 
specific  bank  lending  outlets,  even  with a given  money  supply.  This would 
occur  if the  limitations  on certain  types  of bank  lending  opportunities  were 
to cause  the banks  to cut back  time deposits  or other  nondemand  deposit 
liabilities. 
For convenience,  commercial  and industrial  borrowers  are assumed  to 
fall into two classes:  (a) prime  borrowers,  who have direct  access  to the 
capital  markets,  and  (b) nonprime  borrowers,  who do not have  the option 
of selling securities  (such as bonds or commercial  paper) on the open 
market.  Nonprime  borrowers,  therefore,  have as alternatives  to bank  bor- 
rowing  only  current  saving,  trade  credit  from  prime  borrowers  with  whom 
they do business,  some minor specialized  lending sources  such as com- 
mercial  factors,  and sales of holdings  of outstanding  financial  assets,  such 
as Treasury  bills. 
It is to be expected,  of course,  that consumption  outlays  and business 
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be depressed  by them.  The reasons  are those  just given  for believing  that 
aggregate  demand  will decline  in response  to a reduction  in total bank 
credit.  While  both consumer  and business  borrowers  do have alternative 
sources  of funds,  these  alternatives  will not represent  perfect  substitutes  for 
the  bank  credit  no longer  available.  The  general  process  is the same  whether 
the banks  cut back business  and consumer  lending  solely  by nonprice  ra- 
tioning  or solely  by raising  loan rates  high  enough  to choke  off demand  by 
the desired  amount.  The pervasive  fact of nonprice  rationing  in bank  lend- 
ing, however,  will surely  influence  the distribution  of loan reductions  be- 
tween  business  and  consumer  borrowers  and  between  large  and small  busi- 
ness borrowers. 
Assuming  controls on commercial  and industrial  loans are framed  in 
terms  of the total of such  loans, nonprime  commercial  and industrial  bor- 
rowers  would  probably  suffer  the  largest  proportional  cutback.  In reaction, 
they would  make  use of the financing  alternatives  noted earlier  or dip into 
their own liquid assets,  but there  would also be at least some cutback  in 
physical  investment  in inventories  and in plant and equipment. 
Prime  borrowers  would  also suffer  some  cutbacks  in bank  loans,  though 
they probably  would  be proportionally  smaller.  These  businesses  have all 
the resources  available  to nonprime  borrowers  except  that they are net 
suppliers,  as a group, of trade credit.  Under the assumed  circumstances 
they might well be increasing  rather than decreasing the amount of trade 
credit they supply. Presumably  the volume of flotations of bonds and 
commercial  paper  would  rise,  not only  to compensate  for the reduced  bank 
loans of prime  borrowers  but also to provide  additional  trade credit  to 
nonprime  business  customers.  In the  limit,  however,  at least  some  reduction 
in physical  investment  by the prime  commercial  and industrial  borrowers 
must be assumed. 
Sales finance  companies  could offset reduced  bank loans through  in- 
creased  sales of their own commercial  paper and of other instruments. 
Nevertheless,  there would be at least some reduction  in their lending  to 
consumers.  Consumers  would, indeed, suffer  reductions  in credit both 
from sales finance  companies  and from banks. They would respond  by 
selling  financial  assets,  such  as holdings  of U.S. government  securities,  and 
by reducing  rates  of noncontractual  financial  investment,  such  as flows  into 
savings  institutions.  They could increase  their  use of mortgage  and trade 
credit  to some  extent,  but  they  would  also  curtail  somewhat  their  spending, 
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EFFECTS ON  THE  LEVEL  AND  COMPOSITION 
OF  AGGREGATE  DEMAND 
In contrast  to the case of controls  on total bank credit,  there  does not 
seem to be any general  presumption  about the direction  of influence  of 
controls over particular  components  of bank credit on the level of ag- 
gregate  demand  or on the average  level of interest  rates.  In one limiting 
case, it is possible  to imagine  a structure  of relative  interest  rates  such  that 
an enforced  cutback  in business  and consumer  loans would  lead the com- 
mercial  banks to  a 100 percent  matching  cutback in CDs and similar 
interest-bearing  liabilities.  This would be most likely to  occur if busi- 
ness and consumer  loans were the only assets sufficiently  profitable  to 
justify the marketing  by these banks of CDs and other interest-bearing 
liabilities  at the existing  interest  rates.  In this  case, a cutback  of opportuni- 
ties to lend to business  and consumers  would  leave no profitable  uses for 
CD and similar  money.  Consequently,  instead  of using  the lending  power 
diverted  from  business  and consumer  loans to increase  credit  extended  to 
other  borrowers,  banks  would repay  maturing  interest-bearing  liabilities. 
In this extreme  case, the analysis  would follow exactly  the line developed 
in the previous  section  in connection  with controls  on total bank credit- 
except that the credit  cutback  would clearly  be concentrated  entirely  in 
the areas  of business  and  consumer  lending  under  the present  assumption, 
rather  than being more generally  diffused  through  the banking  system's 
portfolio of assets. Again as in the limitation  on total bank credit,  the 
strong  presumption  here  is that aggregate  demand  would  fall. 
Once one moves away from the assumption  that the cutback  in bank 
credit  to the controlled  categories  is fully offset  by a decline  in interest- 
bearing  bank  liabilities,  however,  the effects  on aggregate  demand  become 
indeterminate.  Thus suppose,  instead,  that banks forced  to cut back on 
business  and  consumer  lending  by a control  program  do divert  some or all 
of these funds  into other,  unregulated  lending  outlets,  such as mortgages 
and tax-exempt  and federal  securities.  In this case, the banking  system's 
demand  schedule  for federal,  state,  and  local securities,  and  for mortgages, 
would shift out to the right.  Unless  this outward  shift  were  fully offset  by 
a leftward  shift in the demand  for these assets  by the nonbank  public  in 
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and unlikely  possibility3-  then rates on one or more of these types of 
assets  will fall at the initial  level and sectoral  distribution  of aggregate  de- 
mand.  Some  shifts  in the composition  of output  can, therefore,  be expected 
in this case, with declines  in consumption  and business  spending  being 
partially  or wholly offset  by rises in spending  by state and local govern- 
ments  or for residential  construction.  Whether  such  rises prove  to be less 
than offsetting,  just offsetting,  or more  than offsetting  depends  in part on 
the relative  interest  elasticities  of demand  of the various  sectors. 
Imagine  a situation,  for example,  in which  only  business  loans  were  sub- 
ject to quantitative  ceilings.  Assume that banks offset declines  in their 
holdings  of such loans entirely  through  increased  holdings  of mortgages. 
Suppose  further  that the demand  for housing is more sensitive  to rates 
and to "credit  availability"  (in some sense) than is business  investment 
demand.  There  will be an initial excess supply of business  paper at the 
initial  configuration  of interest  rates  matched  by an initial  excess  demand 
for mortgages.  Bond rates,  for example,  will rise and mortgage  rates  will 
fall, increasing  aggregate  demand  owing  to the assumed  greater  sensitivity 
of housing  to interest  rates. 
Thus the theoretical  range of possible  effects of controls over specific 
components  of bank credit  runs all the way from reduced  to augmented 
aggregate  demand.  What  course  would  actually  develop  clearly  depends  on 
a large number  of elasticities.  Without  firm  knowledge  of these, one can 
only attempt  a judgment  of the probable  outcome. 
The history  of recent  periods  of tight money suggests  that, confronted 
with a limitation  of business  and consumer  loan outlets,  large-city  banks, 
at least, would  probably  reduce  outstanding  interest-bearing  liabilities  on 
balance  rather  than divert  most of the available  funds to other outlets. 
First,  these other  outlets  are unlikely  to be very  profitable,  given  the very 
high  costs of, for example,  Eurodollars  and  the probable  high  costs (in the 
absence  of Q ceilings)  of CDs. The restricted  outlets, by contrast,  have 
quite high yields. Consumer  loan rates are relatively  high and loans to 
long-standing  business  customers  with substantial  deposit balances are 
also  likely  to be quite  profitable-at least  from  a long-run  view.  Moreover, 
the maturity  structure  of alternative  investment  outlets,  such  as mortgages 
and tax-exempt  bonds, is poorly matched  to relatively  short-dated  CDs 
and  Eurodollar  loans.  Thus on grounds  of both profitability  and  liquidity, 
it seems  plausible  that large-city  banks, at least, would use a substantial 
13. It rules out any effect of loan restriction  on business  and consumer  demands  for 
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part of the funds released  by the curtailment  of business  and consumer 
loans  to repay  interest-bearing  liabilities  rather  than  redirecting  these  funds 
to other, unrestricted  loan and investment  categories.  Smaller  banks, to 
be sure, may not have large amounts  of high-cost  liabilities  outstanding 
and  so might  use a larger  fraction  of the funds  no longer  tied up in business 
and consumer  loans for reinvestment  in other investment  outlets such as 
mortgages.  On balance,  however,  a reasonable  guess is that controls  on 
business  and consumer  borrowing  would tend to depress  credit to, and 
spending  in, these  sectors,  with only a partially  offsetting  increase  in credit 
flows  to other  sectors.  If this is true,  such  controls  would  probably  tend to 
depress  aggregate  demand  over  and  above  the restrictive  effects  of whatever 
slowdown  in the monetary  growth  rate  was  being  pursued  (and  would  thus 
probably  call for some alteration  in this growth  rate). 
There  is a more  fundamental  point,  however:  Whether  banks  respond  to 
restrictions  on business  lending  mainly  by increasing  lending  to other  sec- 
tors or mainly  by repaying  expensive  interest-bearing  liabilities,  the restric- 
tive controls  on business  and consumer  spending  would tend to depress 
these particular sectors  for  any given level of aggregate demand.  To put it 
slightly  differently,  the slowdown  in the growth  of the  money  supply  needed 
to achieve  a given  slowdown  in aggregate  demand  might  be greater  or less 
with selective  controls  on bank  credit  components  than  without  such con- 
trols. In either case, however,  the imposition  of controls  would mean a 
relatively  larger  slowdown  in the sector  subject  to controls  and a relatively 
smaller  slowdown  in the uncontrolled  sectors.  Consequently,  such  controls 
could  be used to encourage  a relatively stronger  performance  by such sec- 
tors  as housing  and  state  and  local  government  during  a period  of monetary 
restriction. 
As a means  of making  business  spending  bear  relatively  more,  and  hous- 
ing relatively  less, of the brunt of tight money, quantitative  controls  on 
bank loans to business  have both advantages  and disadvantages  in terms 
of economic  issues alone, leaving aside the many important  equity and 
procedural  questions.  In general,  there  appear  to be two basically  different 
ways of influencing  the sectoral  distribution  of credit  flows during  tight 
money periods.  One method concentrates  on reducing  the sensitivity  to 
tight money of credit  flows to favored  sectors.  This method  is essentially 
the approach  that  is now being  used  with  respect  to housing  through  direct 
federal  lending,  through  lending  to private  intermediaries  specializing  in 
mortgage  finance,  and through the provision of federal guarantees  for 
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to sectors  that are  not favored,  as would  be the case  with controls  on bank 
lending  to business.  Since  the effect  of the first approach  is to reduce  the 
overall  sensitivity  of aggregate  demand  to interest  rates and credit avail- 
ability,  it requires  a relatively  high level of interest  rates  (a relatively  low 
rate of monetary  growth)  to achieve  any given  slowdown  in demand.  The 
advantage  of the second approach,  if advantage  it be, is that it tends to 
lower the level of interest  rates  associated  with any slowdown  in aggregate 
demand. 
A ceiling  on the interest  rate payable  on large  CDs shares  some of the 
allocative  and interest  rate features  of direct  controls  on business  loans to 
the extent  that in a tight money period,  business  loans suffer  most when 
banks  are  unable  to raise  marginal  funds  through  marketing  CDs. Taking 
note of the 1970 suspension  of ceilings  on short-dated,  large CDs, some 
capital market  observers  have recently  suggested  that if ceiling rates on 
large  CDs are  not used  in some  future  period  of monetary  restraint,  alterna- 
tive and more direct  controls  over business  lending  by banks  might  have 
to be imposed  to prevent  housing  from bearing  a still larger  share  of the 
burden  in restraining  aggregate  demand.14 
While  devices  that tend to restrain  bank  lending  to business  may, from 
some  points  of view,  have  beneficial  effects  on the allocation  of credit,  they 
14. See Albert Wojnilower,  "The Environment  of the 1970's: Can Capital Market 
Controls  be Avoided?"  (speech  delivered  to the National Industrial  Conference  Board, 
New York, January  14, 1971; processed);  and Henry  Kaufman,  "Discipline  and Stimu- 
lation in the 1971 Credit  Markets"  (speech  delivered  before the Sixth Annual Financial 
Conference  of the National Industrial  Conference  Board,  February  17, 1971;  processed). 
Wojnilower  argues  that "we must expect . . . that next time around  banks will be made 
subject to asset reserve requirements-that they will be required to  distribute  their 
funds and credit  lines in specified  proportions  among particular  assets.  . . The banks 
who campaigned  so ardently  and arduously  for the abolition of Regulation  Q may find 
that they have made a bad bargain;  while free to compete  for funds, they may be much 
more restricted  in how they may use . ..  them." Similarly,  Kaufman  states that "there 
are strong  expectations  that the monetary  authorities  will not use the Q ceiling  as a dis- 
ciplinary  measure  the next time restraint  is required. ...  How the banks will employ 
these additional  funds will have far reaching  implications....  If the commercial  banks 
do not enlarge their role in the mortgage market voluntarily, the consequences  are 
likely to be ...  selective  credit measures  during  the next period of restraint." 
Governor  Andrew  Brimmer  of the Federal  Reserve  Board has suggested  differential 
reserve  requirements  on various  categories  of bank  loans as a suitable  selective  credit  de- 
vice; see, for example,  "The Banking  Structure  and Monetary  Management"  (a talk to 
the San Francisco  Bond Club, April 1, 1970; processed),  and Statement  before  the Sub- 
committee  on Financial  Institutions  of the Senate  Committee  on Banking,  Housing and 
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may have  different,  and adverse,  implications  for other  aspects  of the allo- 
cation problem.  In particular,  small businesses  are likely to bear  propor- 
tionally  the larger  part  of any  overall  reduction  of bank  lending  to business. 
Small  businesses  are,  moreover,  far more  dependent  on bank  lending  than 
are large  businesses.  Consequently,  programs  restricting  business  borrow- 
ing may aid one set of vulnerable  borrowers,  namely  prospective  home- 
owners,  largely  at the expense  of a different  set of vulnerable  borrowers,  the 
small  businessmen.  The next  section  analyzes  credit  controls  aimed  directly 
at large  business  borrowers  through  controls  over corporate  bond issues. 
Effects  of Quantitative  Restraints  on Corporate  Security  Issues 
Without  attempting  to deal  with  the complex  practical  issues  that would 
arise  in controlling  corporate  bond issues,  one can  imagine  a central  regis- 
tration  bureau-a sort of "capital  issues  committee"-to which  all poten- 
tial issuers  of corporate  long-term  debt, whether  it is to be publicly  sold 
or privately  placed,  would  have  to apply.  (As before,  the level-or  rate of 
growth-of  the money supply  is assumed  to be unchanged.)  The agency 
might  have  control  both over  the amount  of securities  to be sold and over 
the timing  of the offering.  It might  even adopt a system  of priorities  con- 
sciously  designed  to discriminate  in favor  of certain  categories  of borrowers 
and  against  others.  For present  purposes,  however,  the  main  point  is simply 
that the agency  operates  so as to reduce  the aggregate  volume  of offerings 
in the market  below  what  it otherwise  would  be. Of course,  the volume  of 
bonds sold could also be restricted  by rationing  buyers  rather  than by 
rationing  sellers.  However,  this approach  would seem to be much more 
complex  administratively.  Moreover,  it would  tend to raise  bond interest 
rates  above  their  free  market  equilibrium  level rather  than to lower  them, 
as would  the type of capital  issues  control  envisioned  here. 
By assumption,  only  prime  business  borrowers  can  float  bonds  and  there- 
fore only they are directly  affected  by the capital  issues  control.  They  can 
offset  part  of their  loss of funds  by reducing  trade  credit  extended  to non- 
prime  business.  For nonfinancial  business  as a whole, however,  the only 
possible  offsets  are  (1) increased  bank  loans,  (2) increased  sales  of commer- 
cial paper,  (3) sales of financial  assets  such as Treasury  bills, and (4) re- 
duced inventory  and fixed investment.  Again, there is every reason to 
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Even at unchanged  interest  rates, increased  bank loans are not a perfect 
substitute  for bond sales  because  of their  much  shorter  maturity  and  there- 
fore  poorer  balance  sheet  or liquidity  properties.  Similarly,  increased  issues 
of commercial  paper or sales of short-dated  U.S. government  securities 
by businesses  needing funds are highly imperfect  substitutes  for issues 
of corporate  bonds. These alternatives,  even when feasible in sufficient 
volume,  would  involve  a deterioration  in business  balance  sheet  positions. 
Finally, as far as the nonprime  business  borrowers  are concerned,  banks 
will probably  be unwilling  to offset  fully with new bank loans the loss of 
trade  credit  formerly  obtained  from  prime  borrowers.  The upshot  of these 
considerations  is the commonsense  conclusion  that business  spending  will 
in fact  be curtailed  to some  degree  as a result  of the restriction  of corporate 
bond sales. 
To the extent that reduced  corporate  bond issues are in fact offset  by 
reductions  in capital  spending,  rather  than by the adoption  of alternative 
modes of finance,  the net demand  for funds  by business  on the financial 
markets  at the initial set of interest  rates will be reduced.  To the same 
extent,  the net supply  of credit  to other  nonfinancial  sectors  at the initial 
set of interest  rates  will rise. Corporations,  to be sure,  would  be sellers  of 
the instruments  of these other sectors,  as already  noted. Moreover,  since 
total  bank  credit  is unchanged,15  and  since  banks  will  increase  their  volume 
of business  loans,  they  will also  have  to be net sellers  in order  to make  room 
for these additional  business  loans. However,  consolidated  net sales of 
nonbusiness  paper  by business  and by the banks  will equal  the originally 
legislated  cutback  in corporate  sales of corporate  securities  less the reduc- 
tion in business  investment  spending.  In other  words,  individuals  and  non- 
bank  financial  intermediaries  will still  have  a net supply  of funds  even  after 
absorbing  bank and business  sales of other  instruments. 
This situation  may  be clarified  by a numerical  example,  showing  changes 
in assets  and  liabilities  of nonfinancial  businesses  and  of banks  (Illustration 
1). In this case,  the effect  of the capital  issues  control  is assumed  to reduce 
by 10  the net  flow of corporate  financing  in the bond  market.  Corporations 
are  assumed  to respond  by increasing  bank  loans  by 6, by reducing  their  net 
15. There  is certainly  no reason why total bank credit  should fall. Quite conceivably 
it might rise if the additional business loan demand induced banks to sell additional 
CDs and other interest-bearing  liabilities.  Such a circumstance  would, however,  merely 
strengthen  the conclusion  that the supply of credit to other nonfinancial  sectors would 
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acquisition of instruments of other nonbank sectors (for instance, Treasury 
bills) by 1, and by cutting the level of capital investment by 3. Since the 
level (or rate of change) of bank credit is assumed to be unaffected, the 
increased rate of  acquisition of business loans by banks is matched by 
sales (or reduced rates of  acquisition) of paper issued by  other sectors. 
Thus the net supply of funds by the nonbank, nonbusiness sectors declines 
by 3, even after allowing for the reduction in bank lending to these sectors; 
that is, 3 equals 10 (the reduction in corporate bond sales), less 1 (the sale 
of Treasury bills), less 6 (the reduction in bank credit extended to  these 
other sectors). 
Illustration 1 
All nonfinancial  business 
i\ Investment  -3  i\ Bond flotations  -10 
i\ Holdings  of debt of  i\ Bank loans  +  6 
all other sectors  -1 
-4  4 
Commercial  banks 
i\ Business  loans  +6 
i\ Holdings  of debt of 
all other sectors  -6 
0  0 
Now  since any reduction in corporate investment makes available a net 
supply of funds at existing rates to the other nonfinancial sectors, average 
rates on the instruments issued by these sectors should fall. Moreover, if 
spending is at all interest elastic in these sectors, the rise in outlays within 
them will at least partially offset the decline in spending in the business 
sector.16  Illustration 2 reflects the flow of funds accounts in a case where a 
16. The argument  can be put somewhat  more  precisely:  To the extent that the reduc- 
tion in bond sales by the business  sector is offset by reductions  in physical  investment, 
the consolidated  net financial  investment  of the other nonfinancial  sectors and of the 
nonbank financial  intermediaries  must decline. This is the accounting  truism  shown in 
the illustration.  Also as a matter  of accounting,  this decline  in net financial  investment 
by consumers  (and others)  must  be offset  either  by increased  investment  in, say, housing 
or by a decline in current  saving. The economic argument  of the text is that given the 
initial, pre-controls  values of income and interest  rates, consumers  and nonbank  finan- 
cial intermediaries  will bid down yields on, for example,  mortgages,  stimulating  invest- 
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fall in business spending of the amount assumed in Illustration 1 turns out 
to be just offset by a rise in outlays for residential construction. (The num- 
bers for the business and banking sectors in Illustration 2 are the same as 
those in Illustration 1, but this time more detail is presented both for these 
and the remaining sectors.) 
Illustration  2 
All nonfinancial  business 
i\ Investment  -3  i\ Bond flotations  -10 
i\ Governments  -1  i\  Bank loans  +  6 
-4  -4 
Consumers 
i\ Corporate  bonds  -5  i\ Mortgages  +3 
i\ Governments  +4 
i\ Housing  +3 
i\ Nonbank  financial 
intermediaries 
liabilities  + 1 
+3  +3 
Commercial  banks 
i\ Business  loans  +6 
A Governments  -4 
i\ Mortgages  -2 
0  0 
Nonbank financial  intermediaries 
i\ Corporate  bonds  -5  i\ Liabilities  +1 
i\ Governments  +1 
i\ Mortgages  +5 
+1  +1 
how responsive  housing proves to be to the decline in interest costs. If the resulting 
stimulus to housing just exactly offsets the decline in business investment  (as in Illus- 
tration 2), equilibrium  GNP, saving, and total investment  are unchanged.  If, however, 
the demand  for housing (and  /or other nonbusiness  investment  items) is completely  un- 
responsive  to declines  in yields on mortgage  and other instruments,  GNP must decline 
until the (induced)  decline  in nonbusiness  saving  just equals  the initial decline  in business 
investment  attributable  to the capital issues control. This extreme possibility can be 
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To what extent  would a capital  issues  control  deter  business  spending, 
and  therefore  free  funds  for spending  in other  sectors?  In practice,  a main 
determinant  might  be the expected  duration  of the embargo  on corporate 
bond flotations.  The chief factor  deterring  business  from simply  replacing 
reduced  sales of bonds  with increased  bank  borrowings  (or increased  sales 
of Treasury  bills and other short-term  financial  assets)  would probably 
prove  to be the adverse  effects  of such substitutions  on the maturity  struc- 
ture of business  liabilities.  Obviously,  firms  will not undertake  long-lived 
investment  projects  if they expect long-term  financing  to be indefinitely 
unavailable.  On the other  hand,  if they expect  the capital  issues  control  to 
last only a few months,  they would probably  be willing  to increase  their 
bank borrowings  as a temporary  substitute  for sales of long-term  bonds. 
Indeed, a control program  announced  in advance  to last for only a few 
months  might  well  have  only  very  small  effects  on business  investment. 
Since  business  spending  undoubtedly  would  be restricted  to some  degree 
by controls  over corporate  bond issues,  this measure  has much  the same 
allocational  impact  (and  appeal)  as controls  over  bank  lending  to business. 
A given degree  of restraint  on aggregate  demand,  engineered  by general 
monetary  and fiscal  policies,  would be associated  with a relatively  larger 
impact on business  spending  and a relatively  smaller  impact on housing 
and other sectors.  Relative  to controls over bank lending  to businesses, 
moreover,  it has the appeal  (to some) of falling  directly  on large  business 
and  therefore  avoiding  the discrimination  against  small  business  that seems 
to be inherent  in restrictions  on bank  lending  to business.  No doubt  there 
is something  in this-but  only something.  Small  businesses  would be re- 
stricted  by rationing  of bond issues even though they themselves  do not 
utilize  this form  of financing;  for corporate  business  would  respond  to the 
restraint  in part by reducing  trade credit  to smaller  firms  that would, in 
turn,  be forced  to rely  more  heavily  on bank  loans.  At the same  time, more- 
over, the larger  firms  would also be turning  to the banks for short-term 
accommodation  while  waiting  out the embargo  on bond sales.  Thus there 
would be less bank credit  available  for small  firms  at the very  time when 
they became  more dependent  on it. 
Summary  and  Conclusions 
One broad  conclusion  emerges  from  the preceding  analysis  of quantita- 
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such  controls  can, for better  or for worse,  exert  an influence  over  both the 
level and composition  of aggregate  demand.  The reason  is that disruption 
of normal  financial  channels  will, at least  in the short  run,  be adjusted  to in 
part  by reductions  in outlays  for goods  and  services  in the sectors  affected.17 
Unless  the controls  over  financing  are  extremely  comprehensive,  to be sure, 
alternative  sources  of funds  to finance  real  outlays  will  be available  and  will 
be used. These  alternative  sources,  however,  will be regarded  as imperfect 
substitutes  on the part of the potential  borrowers,  because of relatively 
undesirable  effects on balance sheet structure,  inferior convenience  or 
higher  transactions  costs,  relatively  higher  interest  rates,  and  more  stringent 
credit  rationing. 
While  one side of the story  is that alternatives  are  never  perfect  and  that, 
as a result,  some net effects  on spending  will take place,  the other  side is 
that alternatives  do exist and that in a financial  system as flexible and 
sophisticated  as ours they are likely to bear readily  a substantial  part of 
the burden  of adjustment  to the imposition  of controls  on particular  credit 
channels.  Moreover,  the ability  of the financial  markets  to provide sub- 
stitutes  for any credit channel  that is subjected  to control undoubtedly 
increases  with time, as firms  seek and find new alternatives,  establish  new 
contacts,  create  new instruments,  overcome  set-up  costs, and so on. 
Quantitative  controls  over  total bank  credit  could  in principle  be used  to 
hold it below the level that would otherwise  emerge  in conjunction  with 
some targeted  money supply.  Given such controls,  the banks would find 
an incentive  to reduce  other liabilities,  mainly  CDs and Eurodollar  bor- 
rowings.  Reflecting  the financial  system's  inability  to provide  perfect  sub- 
stitutes  for  restricted  channels  of credit  flows,  at least  in the short  run,  there 
would  be some cuts in spending  and therefore  at least some tendency  for 
aggregate  demand  to fall. 
What  is true  of the effects  of direct,  quantitative  controls  over  total  bank 
credit,  given  the money  supply,  is also true  of indirect  controls  through  the 
application  of such  devices  as Regulation  Q to nondemand  deposit  liabili- 
ties. These devices  also have the effect of retarding  the growth of bank 
credit  relative  to what  it would otherwise  be for any given  rate of growth 
17. Of course, any device that influences  relative  interest  rates, whether  quantitative 
credit  controls, a system of taxes and subsidies  on interest  rates paid on different  kinds 
of financial instruments,  or a system of differential  asset reserve  requirements  for one 
or more types of financial intermediaries,  will influence at  least  the composition  of  ag- 
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in the  money  supply.  Like  direct  controls  on total  bank  credit,  these  devices 
disrupt  normal  credit  channels  and  force  borrowers  to rely  on more  expen- 
sive and less convenient  (perhaps  even nonexistent)  substitutes.  Thus they 
also reduce  spending  by these borrowers,  lowering  aggregate  demand.  By 
rationing  some credit  demands  out of the market,  these  devices,  again  like 
direct  credit  controls,  may also tend to lower somewhat  the general  level 
of interest  rates associated  with any given overall  degree  of restraint  on 
aggregate  demand-although both direct  credit  controls  and devices like 
Regulation  Q could  also conceivably  tend  to raise  some  interest  rates. 
As noted  earlier,  direct  controls  on total  bank  credit  in the form  of quan- 
titative ceilings  do not seem to have any significant  technical  advantages 
over  the existing  instruments  of monetary  control.  Such  ceilings  do not ap- 
pear to be needed  to achieve  any desired  degree  of general  monetary  re- 
straint,  given  the power  of more  orthodox  instruments.  Moreover,  they  do 
not seem  likely  to speed  the response  of the economy  to monetary  restraint. 
The  main  limitation  on the speed  with  which  restraint  can  be achieved  with 
existing  tools appears  to be the need  to avoid  overly  abrupt  adjustments  in 
financial  markets,  not technical  limitations  inherent  in the existing  ma- 
chinery.  The allocational  and interest  rate effects  that might be achieved 
with ceilings  on total bank  credit,  given  the money  supply,  can, if it seems 
desirable,  generally  be accomplished  with  Regulation  Q and  similar  inhibi- 
tions on the issuance  of interest-bearing  bank  liabilities. 
Generally  speaking,  the main interest  of credit  controls  seems  to lie in 
their  potential  for altering  the incidence,  rather  than  the overall  efficacy,  of 
restrictive  monetary  policies.  From this point of view, controls  over par- 
ticular  components  of bank  credit  appear  far more  relevant  than controls 
over  the total. Controls  over  bank credit  components,  especially  business 
and consumer  loans, could  be expected  to have  depressing  effects  on these 
sectors. By expanding  bank credit flows to other sectors,  such controls 
could have  stimulating  effects  there  that might,  in principle,  offset  or even 
outweigh  their  depressing  effects  on business  and consumer  spending.  To 
be sure,  banks  might  in practice  react  to curbs  on business  lending  mainly 
by repaying  interest-bearing  liabilities  rather  than by expanding  credit  to 
other  sectors.  This possibility,  however,  does not invalidate  the more gen- 
eral  point that such  controls  would  permit  any given  degree  of overall  re- 
straint  on total demand  to be achieved  with relatively  more restraint  on 
business  spending  and relatively  less restraint  on other  sectors,  including 
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commercial  banks  and other  savings  institutions  are,  on balance,  good for 
housing,  ceilings  on large CDs probably  do have some beneficial  effects 
for housing  (and other sectors)  much like those that might result from 
direct  controls  on bank  lending  to business. 
A problem  with direct  controls  on lending  to business  and, by implica- 
tion, with Q ceilings  on large  CDs as well, is that they may hit hardest  at 
the small  businessman  who is a relatively  marginal  borrower  and who is 
relatively  more  dependent  on bank  lending  as a source  of funds.  This  prob- 
lem suggests  the possibility  of a capital issues control as an alternative 
means  of restricting  business  spending,  since  such  a control  would  impinge 
directly  only on large  corporations  that normally  use bond financing  as a 
means  of obtaining  funds.  The ability  of controls  on capital  issues  to re- 
strict  business  without  hitting  small  business  disproportionately  should  not 
be exaggerated,  however.  Withdrawal  of trade  credit  by hard-pressed  large 
firms  would  tend to force  smaller  business  into the banks  at the very  time 
the larger  firms  are also turning  to them for temporary  accommodation. 
Finally,  as noted earlier,  even if a given  credit  control  can be shown  to 
lead  to a desirable  resource  reallocation,  it does not necessarily  follow  that 
such a control  should  be adopted.  One must  always  ask whether  the same 
reallocation  effects  could be achieved  better  by other  means  and whether, 
in any case, the quantitative  effects  of the control are likely to be large 
enough to  outweigh the inevitable  administrative  and other problems 
associated  with it. Comments  and 
Discussion 
James  Duesenberry:  Most people agree  that the present  arrangements  for 
influencing  economic  activity  through  monetary  policy  work  through  long 
and  complex  chains  of interaction  in the market.  The whole  thing  is a kind 
of Rube Goldberg  machine.  Second,  it is widely  recognized  that the quan- 
titative effects  of monetary  policy are not precisely  predictable,  and that 
the time lags may be long and variable.  Third,  it is also generally  agreed 
that monetary  policy has significant  and often undesirable  side effects. 
Some of these are on resource  allocation,  particularly  with respect  to the 
housing  sector.  Others  include  the redistribution  of wealth,  threats  to the 
solvency  of financial  institutions,  and the danger  of financial  crisis that 
accompany  a powerful  dose of monetary  restraint. 
As a result,  popular  demand  arises  for some mechanism  that will work 
more  directly,  more  surely,  more  rapidly,  and  with  less adverse  side  effects. 
Some devices  have been developed  to improve  the mortgage  market  and 
to reduce  the credit  rationing  to that sector  during  periods  of tight  money. 
However,  people  are  looking  for something  that  restricts  competing  sectors 
in addition  to cushioning  the impact  on especially  vulnerable  sectors. 
The  Davis  paper  contributes  to this  exploration.  It examines  the question 
of whether  stabilization  efficiency  could  be increased  or adverse  side  effects 
reduced  by using a variety of different  types of direct  controls.  I agree 
with Davis' general  conclusions  and I like his approach, 
The basic principle  underlying  the analysis is its conception of the 
function  of the banking  system.  Even with a constant  money supply,  as 
postulated  in the paper,  the banking  system  intermediates  the supply  of 
savings  and the demand  for credit  through  pooling, through  specialized 
credit evaluation,  through  the use of its own capital, and through  com- 
bining the credit system with the payments  mechanism.  The banking 
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system  offers  liabilities  that are  more attractive  to depositors  at any given 
rate of interest  than the liabilities  of households,  firms,  and governments 
that obtain  their credit  from banks,  thus reducing  the cost of capital all 
around. 
Suppose  banks are prohibited  from offering  time deposits.  Then the 
spending  units that now sell their liabilities  to banks would have to sell 
directly  to the public or to other intermediaries.  Large businesses  that 
issue commercial  paper  presumably  could develop  fairly  close substitutes 
for bank credit.  They might experience  some adverse  price effect,  but it 
would  probably  not be much.  Small  businesses,  on the other  hand,  would 
find  it much  more  difficult  to finance  themselves  directly.  They  would  have 
to go through  factors  or equipment  finance  companies,  or use  trade  credits. 
They would find the terms of credit much less favorable.  There would 
undoubtedly  be some  tendency  for them  to reduce  expenditures.  In short, 
if the banking  system is performing  a function, the elimination  of the 
system,  or even  just its time deposits  (so the money supply  can be held 
constant),  must  raise  the cost of capital  to those  dependent  on bank  credit. 
Analogously,  if we ban vegetable  wholesalers  and  they  perform  a valuable 
function,  we would expect  to find  higher  costs of vegetables  at retail and 
lower  returns  to vegetable  farmers,  especially  small  farmers. 
Everything  taken  together,  the net restraint  would  be much  smaller  than 
the gross restraint  on bank lending. The mortgage  market  would ease 
as funds  previously  held  in consumer  time deposits  flowed  into the savings 
and  loan associations.  However,  there  would  be some net restrictive  effect 
in addition  to what would be obtained  by control of the money supply. 
Average  interest  rates  might  be lower and the allocation  of credit  to the 
mortgage  and municipal  bond markets  might  be improved. 
There  are, however,  some costs to pay for such a policy, or the more 
relevant  policy of a partial  restraint  on bank  credit.  One, of course,  is the 
heavy  impact  on small  businesses.  The regulations  could be fixed  to give 
them special  protection,  but that is just the way that nice, simple  regula- 
tions get very  complicated  and cumbersome.  Second,  risk and uncertainty 
would be increased  even for large businesses,  because the commercial 
paper  market  is not as dependable  as bank  credit  lines. 
If the regulations  became  a normal  instrument  of monetary  restraint,  the 
financial  system  would  adapt  to them.  Large  businesses  would  be induced 
to build  up their  liquidity  in periods  of relaxation.  The  monetary  authority 
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conditions  that  would  be desired  to stimulate  the economy  would  permit  a 
buildup  in liquidity,  which  in turn  would  delay  and  impair  the effectiveness 
of restrictive  monetary  policies  during  a subsequent  boom. In responding 
to the dilemma,  the central  bank would be forced  either  to keep money 
tighter  than would  be desirable  in slack  times or to settle  for less effective 
restraint  in boom times. For these reasons,  quantitative  restrictions  must 
not be allowed  to become  anticipated;  they  must  "sneak  up"  on the market 
quickly and unexpectedly  to be effective.  The banking system was not 
completely  surprised  in 1969 after  its experiences  of 1966, and it evaded 
fairly  effectively  the impact  of Regulation  Q during  most of 1969.  When 
the control  finally  began  to have some  effect,  it came  dangerously  close to 
causing  a real  credit  crisis.  All of this argues  that Regulation  Q (and per- 
haps  other  restrictive  regulations)  ought  to be available  for emergency  use, 
but should  not be used normally  in an ordinary  peacetime  expansion. 
This leads me to the further  conclusion  that the regulation  of business 
investment,  either to stabilize  economic  activity or to shift resources  to 
other sectors,  should  be applied  directly.  Monetary  policy, in so far as it 
is directed  toward  the control  of business  investment,  is a device  for raising 
the cost of credit  or rationing  it. The cost of investment  could be raised 
directly  in a boom by putting  a temporary  tax on it-the  reverse  of the 
investment  tax credit.  The timing properties  of a tax would not be par- 
ticularly  favorable  either,  but would be as good as those of a rise in the 
interest  rate.  In view of the defects  of monetary  policy  in terms  of lags and 
uncertainties,  we ought  to have more strings  to our bow. There  are some 
arguments  for supplementary  weapons  to control  business  investment  and 
an instrument  of variable  taxation  might  be useful. 
David Fand: Davis analyzes  three kinds of quantitative  credit controls: 
(a) limits  on total bank  credit  but not its composition,  (b) limits  on specific 
components  of bank credit but not its total, (c) limits on specific users 
of credit. Davis suggests that direct control over total bank credit is 
analytically  equivalent  to indirect  controls through Regulation  Q,  and 
argues  that it will have a net restrictive  effect  on aggregate  demand  and on 
interest  rates. In contrast,  he finds that specific  quantitative  controls on 
particular  categories  of bank credit  and on particular  users  of credit  may 
have a selective  impact on particular  categories  of expenditure  without 
necessarily  affecting  aggregate  demand. 
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monetary  restraint,  he concludes, since this restraint  can be achieved 
readily by the conventional  instruments.  In particular,  the effects of 
direct quantitative  controls over total bank credit may also be accom- 
plished  with existing  indirect  controls,  such as Regulation  Q, that inhibit 
the issuance  of interest-bearing  bank  liabilities. 
The main appeal  of direct  controls  on bank  credit  is their  potential  for 
altering  the incidence  rather  than  the efficacy  of restrictive  monetary  policy. 
Accordingly,  control  over  particular  components  of bank  credit  (business 
and consumer  loans, for example)  would seem to offer  the possibility  of 
achieving  more  restraint  on business  and consumer  spending  and thereby 
making available  an expanded  volume of bank credit for other sectors. 
But direct controls on lending  to business,  as well as indirect controls 
achieved  through  Q ceilings  on large CDs, may hit hardest  at the small 
businessman.  From this point of view,  a capital  issues  control  may appeal 
as an alternative  method  of directly  restricting  the large  corporations.  But 
even so, it may hit small business  indirectly.  Finally, we must consider, 
as Davis suggests,  whether  the desired  allocational  effects outweigh  the 
administrative  problems  inevitably  associated  with  such  controls. 
The upshot of this analysis  is that if the aim is a particular  resource 
allocation in the real economy, credit controls over narrowly  defined 
categories  may be more effective  than broadly  defined  controls.  On the 
other  hand,  if credit  controls  are  specified  very  precisely,  they  may also be 
easier  to evade.  It may, therefore,  be difficult  to achieve  specific  objectives 
of resource  allocation  by monetary  or credit  controls.  The conventional 
monetary  instruments  do not lead directly  to any particular  flow of funds; 
and even direct  or indirect  controls  suitable  to engineer  the desired  credit 
flows  may not bring  about  the desired  pattern  of real expenditures.  There 
is one gap between  the monetary  instruments  and the flow of funds in 
credit  markets,  and there  is a second  gap between  the credit  flows  and  the 
pattern  of expenditures  that emerges  in the real  economy. 
Davis argues  that controls  (direct  and indirect)  over total bank credit 
will tend to lower interest  rates and reduce aggregate  demand, on the 
grounds  that they may lower the IS but need not affect the LM curve, 
although  he notes that the result  may be indeterminate.  Moreover,  if we 
take account of the announcement  effects of introducing  controls on 
bank credit and other dynamic  effects,  it is even more difficult  to say 
anything  precise  about  their  likely  impact. 
In analyzing  whether  a particular  set of quantitative  bank  credit  controls 
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accelerates  (decelerates)  the growth  of M2 (MI plus time deposits  in com- 
mercial  banks)  and M3 (M2  plus savings  deposits  in thrift  intermediaries). 
The growth  in M2 and M3 in the last few quarters  has been exceedingly 
large, and one might suspect  that a reduced-form  expenditure  equation 
using  M1 would  therefore  make  large  underprediction  errors  in explaining 
GNP. Yet, the Andersen-Jordan  (Federal  Reserve  Bank of St. Louis) ex- 
penditure  equation  using  M1 seems  to have  projected  the 1971  first  quarter 
results  reasonably  well. One wonders  why the M1 equation  does not seri- 
ously  underpredict  the GNP in recent  quarters.  For one  thing,  the omission 
of interest  rates  would  lead one to expect  an overprediction,  and perhaps 
that omission  just offsets  the omission  of M2 and M3. 
Davis' analysis  does not make  clear  why  the control  of total bank  credit 
should  depress  aggregate  demand  while  controls  over  components  of bank 
credit  act more  like selective  controls.  Why should  we necessarily  get ag- 
gregate  demand  effects  when we control all of bank credit and not get 
such effects  when we control several  major  components  of bank credit? 
After all, bank  credit  is only one component  of total credit. 
It is difficult  to specify at what point selective credit controls have 
important  effects  on aggregate  demand.  Accordingly,  an alternative  pro- 
cedure  is to assume  that even controls  on total bank  credit  do not neces- 
sarily  affect  aggregate  demand-at least as a first  approximation-and  to 
analyze  their  impact  on this basis. 
But I do agree  with  Davis' argument  that a quantitative  difference  may, 
after  some  point,  bring  about  qualitatively  different  effects.  Thus,  suppose 
we steadily  reduce  the scope,  and  extent,  of intermediation  in the economy 
by placing  controls on the intermediaries.  This will raise interest  rates, 
and a larger  and larger  money supply  will be required  to achieve  a given 
GNP. As we interfere  with intermediation  by introducing  an increasing 
array  of selective  controls,  the cumulative  effect could very well restrict 
aggregate  demand.  But we are still left to rationalize  why control over 
total bank  credit,  in contrast  to control  over components  of bank credit, 
achieves  this critical  mass at which selective  controls  begin to have pro- 
nounced  effects  on aggregate  demand. 
Lawrence  Krause:  Because  short-term  interest  rates and monetary  flows 
have joined financial  markets  so completely,  direct controls are seen by 
many  international  economists  as a device  for restoring  some  independent, 
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ments seems  ready  to recommend  that countries  institute  direct  controls 
on credit.  Essentially  the idea is that the growth  in bank credit  would be 
controlled  so that the same  degree  of restraint  could be obtained  without 
the sharp  rises in interest  rates that draw interest-sensitive  funds from 
abroad.  Conversely,  when  monetary  policy  subsequently  eases,  rates  would 
drop  less sharply.  Direct credit  controls  would  thus narrow  the variation 
in market  interest  rates. 
Regulation  Q works  the  wrong  way  in terms  of these  goals.  It exaggerates 
the movement  in international  money  flows.  If there  is monetary  restraint 
at home, it causes more restraint  abroad, and vice versa. Thus, inter- 
national  considerations  would  point to the need for controls  on the asset 
side of the banking  system.  Yet, an analysis  of how quickly  U.S. financial 
institutions  can replace  bank  loans  with other  types  of instruments  should 
make clear that this recommendation  makes no sense for the United 
States. It would be another  ineffective,  unnecessary,  active balance-of- 
payments  policy. 
Richard  Davis: I generally  agree with Duesenberry's  comments  on the 
limitations  of Regulation  Q, as revealed  by recent  experience.  However,  it 
could  be made  more  effective,  if needed,  by application  to a broader  range 
of liabilities  than  just CDs. The Federal  Reserve  can define  more broadly 
what  the regulation  applies  to and it should  use that power. 
In response  to Fand's question  about why control  of total bank credit 
would  be restrictive  on aggregate  demand,  while  partial  control  would  not, 
I want  to explain  that  I think  the control  over  large  segments  would  restrain 
demand,  but I have to allow for the possibility  that the diversion  into 
other  channels  of bank credit  would  neutralize  the aggregate  impact. 
Krause points out that the Bank for International  Settlements  is in- 
terested  in direct  controls.  The impression  I get from a number  of coun- 
tries  that have  invoked  quantitative  credit  controls  is that they feel this is 
the only way they can effectively  regulate  aggregate  demand.  This surely 
is not the case for the United States. 
General  Discussion 
William Branson wondered  why there was such concern about the 
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priate  that  homebuilding  should  be strongly  affected  by stabilization  policy. 
Housing  is an extremely  durable  good. Postponing  construction  of houses 
for a year and letting  the housing  stock get that much older  imposes  less 
disutility  on consumers  than postponing  an equal output of less durable 
goods. Perhaps  the real source  of concern  is the depressed  long-run  trend 
of housing,  rather  than  its cyclical  fluctuations.  In particular  we may  judge 
that the tendency  to rely on monetary  policy  for restraint  and  fiscal  policy 
for stimulus  has held down  the long-run  trend  of homebuilding. 
Several  participants  felt that the vulnerability  of homebuilding  to tight 
money  was far  greater  than could  be accounted  for by the particular  sensi- 
tivity to high interest  rates  that would  be expected  from  long-lived  assets. 
Factories  may be as durable  as homes,  but they do not respond  similarly. 
The imperfections  of the mortgage  market,  its dependence  on thrift in- 
flows, and the extent  of nonprice  rationing  in that market  have  to be part 
of the explanation,  they contended. 
Warren  Smith felt that not enough emphasis  had been placed on the 
differences  in the purpose  and function of the interest  rate ceilings on 
small time deposits  and the interest  rate ceilings  on large certificates  of 
deposit.  Paul Samuelson,  Daniel Brill,  and others  agreed.  Ceiling  rates  on 
small time deposits are not meant to  intensify monetary  restraint  on 
business,  but rather  to protect  the housing sector. In 1966, savings  and 
loan associations  were  facing  a major  liquidity  crisis,  in part  because  banks 
could pay higher rates on time deposits than they could. The Federal 
Reserve  did not have  the legal  authority  until  late 1966  to differentiate  the 
interest  rates paid by banks on small time deposits  from those paid on 
large certificates  of deposit. Since that has been remedied  in part, Brill 
pointed  out, there  has not been the same intense  concern  that the banks 
would  competitively  drain  away  funds  destined  for housing.  Alan Green- 
span noted, however,  that the regulations  on small time deposits  might 
not be equally effective  in another  period of tight money. Just before 
money eased in 1970, some large corporations  had begun to think of 
creating  money market  instruments  in small denominations  that would 
appeal  to small  savers.  Paul  Samuelson  was  concerned  about  the regressive 
impact  of the ceiling  rate on small  time deposits.  The protection  of home- 
building  was achieved  at the expense  of small  savers. 
The impact  of interest  rate ceilings  on large  certificates  of deposit  was 
debated  extensively.  The interest  rate  on large  CDs had been  held  down  to 
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was generally  agreed,  most of the intended  impact  had been evaded.  The 
banks tapped  the Eurodollar  market  for funds and the large businesses 
turned  to the commercial  paper  market.  Perhaps,  Regulation  Q on large 
CDs had made it somewhat  more expensive  and difficult  for large busi- 
nesses  to borrow,  but it had not reduced  their investment  much. It was 
questioned  whether  other  interest  rates  had been held down somewhat  as 
a result.  There  was some discussion  of whether  the controls  might have 
been more effective  if Eurodollar  borrowings  had been restricted,  sacri- 
ficing  the temporary  balance-of-payments  benefits. 
Daniel Brill  wondered  whether  the recent  experience  may have  changed 
the elasticities  of response  in the financial  market.  For many  industrial  bor- 
rowers,  the commercial  paper  market  did not prove  to be a satisfactory 
substitute  for  bank  credit.  And  the  Penn  Central  episode  may  have  impaired 
it as a substitute  device  for a long time  to come.  Bank  credit  lines  may  look 
even more important  as a result.  Brill  noted  that certain  other  intermedi- 
aries,  like finance  companies,  were far more dependent  on bank lines of 
credit  as an  insurance  device  than  on actual  bank  loans.  Restraints  on bank 
lending  would not affect  them as directly  unless  the credit  lines were cut 
back. 
Franco  Modigliani  felt that Regulation  Q might  have  had some  effect  in 
the very  short  run  because  time was required  to build  up other  sources  of 
funds. Paul Samuelson said that quantitative  controls and rationing 
devices  produced  incentives  to create  an ersatz  banking  system  and ersatz 
money-Mi  and M2 really  change  their  meaning.  Duesenberry  suggested 
that  the issue  was  primarily  how  rapidly  and  how  readily  substitutes  for M2 
are created.  As one banking  system  is extinguished,  another  develops.  In 
the intervening  period  of time, the regulations  are effective,  however.  The 
question  is whether  that finite  interval  is long enough  to make the effort 
worthwhile. 
Charles  Bischoff  supported  Duesenberry's  preferences  for direct mea- 
sures, such as a tax to affect  business  fixed investment.  He felt that the 
lenient treatment  of outstanding  orders  when the investment  tax credit 
was restored  in 1967  had created  a credibility  gap. If businessmen  expect 
that all will be forgiven  when a temporary  investment  tax is ended,  they 
will not curb orders  for capital  goods. Bischoff  also suggested  that, if a 
capital  issues  committee  is worthy  of serious  consideration,  one might as 
well have a capital  expenditures  committee  that would focus on the real 
target  directly. 